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European integration reduces the policy autonomy of the member states of
the European Union (EU). For instance, the harmonization of regulation, the
common monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and the rules
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) concerning national fiscal policy all
lead to an erosion of national policy autonomy. Indeed, in the popular
discourse on Europe, there is a widespread belief that nowadays most, if not
all, policies come from ‘Brussels’ and that, therefore, national politics no
longer matter.
Of course, this is not true for a variety of reasons. First, the EU has not
harmonized all possible policy areas and has no intention to do so. Since much
is left for the nation-state and subnational polities, politicians may still
disagree with each other. Second, even in the policy domains in which the
EU members have agreed to harmonize policies, these efforts often fall short
of leading to full convergence, thereby leaving some room for policy diver-
gence between countries. Political parties can use the remaining degrees of
freedom to formulate diverging positions. Third, since politicians know that
EU harmonization leads to an erosion of credible policy disagreement, they
may at one point be reluctant to push ahead with EU harmonization simply
to maintain leverage for political disagreement. In other words, democratic
politics require disagreement and, since politicians are aware of this, they are
unlikely fully to codify regulations and policies at the EU level even if full
harmonization were an efficient and viable solution (which, of course, it is
not). For all these reasons, European integration will not completely remove
the member states’ policy autonomy. Thus, political competition at the
national level will remain intact and important.
The decision-making structure of the EU can be characterized as power-
sharing between national and supranational authorities. European integra-
tion is a process by which bargaining power is shifting from the national to
the European institutions. This process has the tendency gradually to reduce
policy autonomy, thereby limiting the room for political disagreement in
national arenas. This special issue of European Union Politics brings together
papers that analyse the EU’s influence on policy autonomy and its conse-
quences for partisan competition.
One interesting area from the perspective of this special issue is labour
market policies; these policies aim to improve job seekers’ prospects of finding
employment and increase the productivity and earning potential of workers.
They include spending on public employment, labour market training, and
other policies intended to promote employment among the unemployed.
What makes this area somewhat different from many others is the role of
externalities; i.e. the effects of these policies spill across national boundaries,
creating incentives for European governments to free ride off the efforts of
their neighbours. In this issue, Franzese and Hays (pp. 167–189) provide
empirical evidence that an increase in expenditures in one country indeed
decreases equilibrium expenditures in its neighbours, so that current levels
of spending may be too low. Franzese and Hays conclude that stronger
enforcement procedures may be necessary if the EU is to achieve its labour
market policy objectives.
Another interesting field is national fiscal policy. Owing to the SGP, the
freedom to use fiscal policy for national political purposes has been restricted.
However, this does not imply that European governments have no room for
manoeuvre at all. Indeed, in their contribution to this special issue, Mink and
de Haan (pp. 191–211) examine whether there is a political budget cycle in
the countries in the euro area and find strong evidence that fiscal policy-
makers in the euro area have pursued expansionary policies before elections.
This evidence is based on a multivariate model for 1999–2004, which is robust
to the use of various election indicators. Interestingly, the authors find that in
an election year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit
increases. They also find a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal policy
outcomes.
Not all EU member countries have adopted the euro, either because they
do not meet the so-called convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht
Treaty (Sweden), or because they have an opt-out clause (the UK and
Denmark). In the latter case, the countries concerned may decide not to join
the currency union even if they meet the convergence criteria. Yet, the fact
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that these countries are outside the euro area does not imply that they have
not been affected by the introduction of the euro. Plümper and Troeger argue
in this issue (pp. 213–234) that the European common currency reduced the
de facto monetary policy autonomy of the EU countries that did not intro-
duce the euro. An empirical analysis of monetary policy in the UK, Denmark
and Sweden shows that these countries’ monetary policies follow more
closely the ECB’s policy than they had followed the Bundesbank’s policy
before 1994. In addition, Plümper and Troeger demonstrate a diminishing
influence of the US dollar on monetary policy in the UK, Denmark and
Sweden since the countries in the euro area harmonized monetary policies.
In sum, these papers provide ample evidence for policy spillovers, which
in none of the three analysed cases completely abolish national policy
autonomy. However, decisions at the national level are clearly affected by EU
integration, even though the European level does not strictly harmonize the
analysed policies.
What drives the extent to which the ambitions of political parties reflect
the increased role of the EU? How does the growing role of the EU influence
partisan competition at the domestic level? In a democratic system, political
parties have different policy objectives, although there may be a tendency
towards convergence to the position of the median voter. Dorussen and
Nanou (pp. 235–256 in this issue) analyse whether there is more convergence
of party policy platforms on those issues on which the EU has gained policy
competence. Using manifesto data for the policy platforms of approximately
155 political parties in 15 EU member states (from 1951 to 2001), they find
that European integration has increasingly constrained the range of policy
platforms, in particular for parties that are in government and parties that are
generally pro-EU. However, European integration does not appear to restrict
the policy range of the potential minimum winning coalition.
Pennings (pp. 257–270 in this issue) compares the degree of Europeaniza-
tion of national party manifestos, using a newly established database that
comprises the digitized party manifestos of political parties. He finds that the
degree to which parties acknowledge the increasing impact of the EU on
policy-making depends on factors such as the policy sector concerned, how
long a country has been a member of the EU, the general attitude of parties
towards European integration, and the degree of internal consensus on
European issues.
In comparison with national budgets, the EU budget is very limited,
being just over 1% of the EU’s GDP. The second-largest item in the EU budget
is the so-called Structural Funds, which aim to support regions with low per
capita income. Structural Funds are the key mechanism of regional redistri-
bution in the EU. In their contribution to the next issue of European Union
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Politics (Vol. 7, No. 3), Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) apply the
traditional approach on partisan politics and national redistribution to the
EU’s Structural Funds. They use a new data set on both the distribution of
funds across regions and the distribution of vote shares for different factions
of the European Parliament. They find that the traditional left vs. right
cleavage matters: the strength of left parties in a region is positively related
to the size of the transfers the region receives. They also find a relationship
between Eurosceptic parties and transfers, but this link is much weaker.
The articles in this volume lead to the conclusion that EU integration
indeed often reduces policy autonomy at the domestic level even if the EU
does not fully harmonize policies. With European integration influencing
domestic political decisions and reducing de facto policy autonomy, parties
increasingly adjust their manifestos to reflect more closely the growing role
of the EU. Yet there are still plenty of issues for the Left and Right to disagree
about.
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